To James Madison from William Jarvis, 3 November 1808

My last dated 28th. June, which I have transmitted [by a] private conveyance by way of Spain, stated the situation of [pu]blic affairs to that date. The subsequent events have doubtless [been so] fully detailed in the Public Papers which have reached [the U]nited States, as to render any very minute account unnecessary [in this.] The success of the Spaniards encouraged the People in this [Kingd]om untill the French were finally circumscribed to a few [leagues a]round Lisbon & the possion of Evora, Almeida and one or [two ot]her strong places of minor importance, when the British [about] the early part of August landed in the Neighbourhood [of Figu]eira about 22,000 Troops. These forthwith marched [to the] southward, and the French force which had gone to [the A]lentejo with a view to open a communication with that [Provin]ce for the purpose of supplying Grain for the Capital, as [it wa]s given out, were recalled, and all the troops which were [in Lis]bon & the environs, except about a thousand, marched to [join] the others, and which together composed a Corp of twelve [or thir]teen thousand Men. The encounter took place on the [] August in the morning, by the French attacking the [Englis]h entrenchments; in which attack they at first gaind [a co]nsiderable advantage, but were finally obliged to [retrea]t in which they were not pursued by the English, and [a ca]pitulation of the 21st. of August was the consequence [of it.] What was the real cause of such terms I cannot say, [unless] an observation made to me by a person who was an eye[witness] to the action was correct, that the disorder in which [the att]ack of the French threw the British Troops, caused [a retre]at of part of the Army for upwards of a mile and it [was w]ith difficulty, that they there could be recalled and brought back to the [actio]n. Be this as it may the Portuguese [Army] (reported to be 40,000 Strong, but perhaps not more than ha[lf that] number, were in the vicinity, but were not permitted to [enter] the engagement) as well as the nation at large, were highly [dis]satisfied with this as well as the definitive Capitulati[on of] the 30th., but they have not been the occasion of any par[ticular] misunderstanding. The French Troops began their em[bark]ation in the early part of September & compleated it in [the] latter part, except a small number that were in the dista[nt] Garrisons. They took with them all their private prop[erty] and the Public money & valuables. Advice has already b[een] received by an English Frigate that General Junot & his [division] have safely arrived at la Rochelle. No disturbance in [the city] took place before the change, and but little about the [time.] [] a few Frenchmen were pretty severely beat by the small Mobs [and it is] said three or four were killed. The Regency resumed [its func]tions about 20th September, and it has since been p[rincipal]ly engaged in organising the Army. The English Tro[ops] began to march to the Pyrenees about a fortnight [ago] [] upwards of twenty thousand have gone. Ten or twe[lve] thousand will remain here & be distributed in the [Provinces.]

I have conversed with several of the higher Britis[h officers] respecting our affairs. General Ferguson, a Member [of Parlia]ment, in the opposition, seemed to be fully persu[aded] that the Administration were much in the wrong [as it] regarded the United States. He appeared to be [fully] of the opinion that our trade was of much greater [impor]tance to G B, than any advantage that could be [derived] to her Commerce from cutting us off from the C[ontinent. Gener]al Beresford, however was of quite different sentiments. He [introdu]ced American affairs himself, and I continued the [conver]sation the best part of two hours. Throughout the whole [he ta]lked with much temper. In the course of conversation he [dwelt] much upon the supposed opposition to the embargo in [the no]rthern [U]nited States, and the probability that it would cause [a sepe]ration of the union, & built much hope upon the expected [change of] Administration, as he termed it. To this I observed, [that] this was altogether a mistaken opinion founded on the [inflamatory] writtings of some of our intemperate (I might have [said] hireling) Newspaper Editors, that on the reverse the Northern [States] had been among the warmest, to recommend the measure, [and I] was persuaded, that the measure was still approved by [the be]st informed of the Mercantile part of the community, [and a]s to the change of President, it would depend altogether [upon] the resignation of Mr: Jefferson, for I was confident the [people] had so high an idea of his superior abilities, integrity [& patri]otism, that they would re-elect him so long as he [would] serve; but that there could be no doubt, if he refused [serving] again, that Mr. Maddison would be elected, who [doubt]less would pursue the same line of Politics; in fact [that] the Orders in Council had left us no other course, for [if we] opened our Ports, our Vessels must fall a prey to the [Britis]h Cruizers, and if the act prohibiting British Manu[fact]ures was repealed our Country would be drained of specie to pay for them. I also observed that the funds [with] which we paid the large balance due for their Manufac[tures,] was drawn from those Countries they had shut us [out o]f, and that these funds were in payment of mere [articles] of luxury, allowing us therefore a free trade to he Continent [was in f]act making their enemies indirectly contribute to the expences accruing to them from the war. He then said [we] had no right to complain of the injustice of the measure [when] we had submitted to the same thing from France. I r[eplied] that the French orders I believed of the 21st. Novr. 1806 to [which] he alluded were annulled in the subsequent month, as [it re]garded the United States, by the declaration of the Mi[nister] of Marine & Colonies, that our treaty with France wou[ld in] every respect be fulfilled; & that it must be in the know[ledge] of every British Merchant that this declaration had [generally] been rigidly fulfilled, our trade to & from G. Britain [having] remained uninterrupted. He then observed that G Br[itain] had made every advance toward an accommodation [by] sending out an Ambassador Extraordinary to adju[st the] existing differences. I replied that I understood that [this] Gentleman was clothed with no other powers than [that] of treating about the insult offered to the Chesape[ake,] & that was such a small part of our grievances that [Government] was of opinion that it would be highly improper to s[acrifice] the essential interest of our Country to a compliment[ary] acknowledgment of error; upon which he briskly an[swered,] it appears then that Mr. Jefferson will sacrifice the [honor] of his Country to its Interest; I replied that perhap[s some] might conceive it such, but that I was satisfied t[he] President had the real interest & welfare of his Cou[ntry] at heart & that he would steadily pursue them; a[nd at the] same time could not help smiling to observe ho[w the] opinions of even men of sense are warped by pro[fessional] sentiments. There was some desultory conversation [beside] not worth committing to paper. I also twi[ce called] on Sir Wm: Scott, but did not either time find [him] at home. As there were some American Vessels desirous of proceeding to the Azores, Spain &c. an[d not wish]ing to widen the differences by increasing the number of [capt]ures, nor yet to expose the property. I wrote the question, [of w]hich the inclosed is a copy, and gave it to a particular friend [of mi]ne at whose house he staid while in Lisbon to present it [as fro]m himself, to which after a day or two he gave the answer [that] follows; and as it strikes me from what I can learn [that] the B Government is begining to repent of the differ[ences,] I have no doubt that the conduct of the Navy will [corres]pond with his opinion.

[Alth]o’ few persons are suffering more by the continuance of [the E]mbargo than myself, yet from all the information I [can o]btain & every thing I observe, I am persuaded that it is [the o]nly line of Policy we can consistantly pursue, & is that [which] is most likely to obtain us justice; but if it does not [produ]ce this effect in a short time, altho’ I deprecate [war a]s a great evil, I feel myself much inclined to the [opin]ion that Canada & Nova Scotia ought to pay for the [Britis]h depredations on our Commerce.

[Noth]ing material has taken place in Spain for six or [eight] weeks, except the succouring Figuieras in Catalonia [by the] French. The largest part however of the Spanish [regu]lar Forces are collecting in the neighourhood of the [Pyre]nees, which will be joined by a considerable Army of [Englis]h. The encounter will doubtless be terrible, but I [canno]t divest myself of the opinion, but that the talents, skill [disci]pline & courage of the French will vanquish the en[thusia]stic & desperate, but undisciplined bravery of the [Spani]ard.

The Russian Minister has quit Spain, in conse[quen]ce of an insult from the Populace of Madrid [The] Russian Chargé here spoke highly of [the S]pirit with which Mr: Erving and the [rest o]f the Foreign Ministers and Agents behaved on the occasion. With entire Respect I have the honor to [be] Sir, Your Most obed[t Servt]