Adopted Nov. 8th, 1867 .

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I.

Appointment.

In January last, many citizens of New York had their attention called, chiefly by private correspondents, to the danger of a disastrous famine growing out of a drought the previous summer in extensive districts of the southern part of our country. After some individual and desultory action, conferences [221] were held, which resulted in a public meeting, at which the undersigned were commissioned to investigate the facts, and take such action as might appear to be required.

II.

Policy of the Commission.

Information was laid before our preliminary meetings that organizations had already been formed with reference to the same object in some localities of the West, and had begun, each independently of the other, to send means of relief to some point of the region afflicted. Also, that a number of agents had come from the South, commissioned by churches or charitable associations, or by public meetings, to solicit contributions, each for the poor of a special locality, and that the attention of various societies and clubs, having corresponding members or organizations at the South, had already been called to the need for their assistance.

III.

Special Field of Duty.

As most if not all of the organizations above referred to had directed their labors to the destitute of some special locality or destitute district, and it was believed that their method of distribution would be generally guarded and honest, it was deemed best that our undertaking should be adapted not to supersede them or unnecessarily interfere with them, but rather to act as a coordinating and complementary agency for the same general end.

There was reason to believe that the failure of crops had been greatest, and that the extremest want of charitable asssistance would be found among that part of the population living remote from the sea and from the principal lines of inland communication. These would also be most likely to be overlooked by the existing organizations and least likely to set on foot for themselves active measures for obtaining relief from a distance; it was thought important, therefore, to secure direct information from, and means of communication with them.

IV

System of Correspondence and of Distribution.

To establish a new system sufficiently complete to reach those who would most require aid before the extremity of famine should arrive, would obviously be impossible. But two orders of agents were known to exist, which had been designed to bring all the inhabitants throughout the field in question within range of observation; one of these being that subordinate to the [222] Commanders of the several military districts, the other consisting of the civil officers of the local provisional governments.

Upon telegraphing to the several heads of these, we ascertained that they would be available for our purpose, and through them, in a very short time, our Corresponding Secretary, Dr. Edward Bright, was engaged in a voluminous direct correspondence with three-fourths of all the counties in North and South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, and was able to give us sufficiently definite information to guide our further action. Local Committees were then formed by the same agencies, two members of which, in each case, were made officially responsible for the judicious and faithful distribution of whatever should be contributed through our Commission, for the relief of the destitute.

V.

Classification of Duties.

The above arrangements having been initiated, an executive organization of our own body was arranged with a reference especially to the following scheme of duties:

First.—To collect trustworthy information in regard to the degree of aid necessary to preserve the lives of all in every district in which the crop had been greatly shortened.

Second.—To make public the information acquired.

Third.—To suggest, and to aid in the formation of, independent cooperating societies.

Fourth.—To stimulate loans and other forms of aid for all in need at the South, by promoting private correspondence with individuals; this with especial reference to more comprehensive forms of assistance than it came within our own field of duty to offer.

Fifth.—To solicit subscriptions of money to our own treasury, solely with a view to the purchase and transportation of Indian corn, to be distributed gratuitously in small quantities, only to those known to be in extreme want.

VI.

Working Organization.

A general business agent was appointed and five special committees were formed, each of which undertook the supervision of a department of the work. During a period of five months, meetings were held daily by committees, and a general meeting was held once a week.

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VII.

Practical Operations.

A large number of letters, both of an official and private character, were received from the South, and much information was obtained by direct reports of travellers or residents of the afflicted regions who presented themselves at our office. The information collected, from whatever source, and the conclusions drawn from it were furnished to other organizations and systematically made public. During a period of three months no day passed in which newspapers of a large circulation and influence were not supplied with facts and arguments favorable to the purpose in view, and their columns were almost invariably placed at our disposal with a liberality creditable to their editors, a liberality to which those relieved are more indebted perhaps than to any other means by which they have been served. In addition, written letters, printed circulars, letters and handbills were distributed to the number of about 100,000 and advices and appeals were at different times sent by telegraph to the press of the Western and Pacific States. Of the circulars issued, the larger part were addressed personally by name to pastors of churches, to officers of various benevolent societies and to editors, with a view to their further publication. These were calculated not merely to draw contributions to our own treasury, but to stimulate a general charitable movement toward the South through various channels.

While direct assistance to those requiring it, independently of our agency, especially in the form of loans, was systematically advised and encouraged, the pernicious tendency of any course which might seem to anticipate a prolonged dependence on charity or which would relieve any from the necessity of personal labor, was strenuously pointed out.

Pains were also taken that in the distribution of corn, made directly by our own agents, encouragement and assistance should be given as much as possible to those who evinced a disposition to exert themselves industriously for their own support, and that mendicant habits should be discountenanced to the last degree which would be consistent with respect for human life.

Arrangements were made for the purchase of corn at the lowest rates and for its transportation in the cheapest manner. In many cases a part or even the whole of the usual commission and charges were given in. The Government supplied transportation to the Southern ports for 71,000 bushels of corn and a large quantity was carried from the seaports to the interior by river boats and railroads free of charge to our fund.

VIII.

Contributions through the Commission and its Agency.

The whole amount of corn sent directly by our Commission, and distributed by those acting for it, in all cases in small quantities to individuals [224] supposed to be in great need of it for the support of life, has been 169,316 bushels, (an amount sufficient to sustain the life of 600,000 persons during a period of four months.) The cost of this has been $206,287. We have also transmitted $12,000 in cash to trustworthy agents in the South, which has been chiefly used for the relief of the sick.

IX.

Contributions through all Agencies.

It is not within our power to present any general statement of a statistical character showing the total amount of contributions which have been made for the relief of those suffering from the famine. The only definite reports we have received are the following:

The Ladies’ Relief Association of this city, Arthur Leary, Esq., Treasurer, has transmitted contributions to the amount of $80,000. Francis Bacon, Esq., Treasurer, has reported the collection by the Associate Commission at Boston of $50,000.

Samuel Welsh, Esq., Treasurer, has reported the collection by the Philadelphia Commission of $65,000. From each of these cities, as well as from our own, the aggregate amount of contributions made by individuals, commercial firms, churches and other corporations and transmitted directly to correspondents and agents of distribution selected by themselves, is believed to have exceeded those sent through the more public channels.

The whole contribution of Maryland is estimated by Mr. Laurence Sangster, of Baltimore, at $1,000,000; that of Kentucky, by Mr. Samuel A. Miller, of Louisville, at $500,000. Mr. F. R. Brunot, of Pittsburgh, estimates the amount of contributions transmitted directly from that city at $30,000. Mr. Jackson, of Atlanta, Georgia, collected in Illinois 75,000 bushels of corn, and 40,000 of wheat. Many others passed through the same State and other parts of the north, and made large collections, but have made no public reports to our knowledge.

We have no definite returns from St. Louis, where a very active and energetic Commission, was early in the field, nor from Chicago, Cincinnati, and several other commercial centres, from which large amounts were undoubtedly sent.

The total amount which has been contributed for the relief of those suffering at the South from famine during the last year may be roughly estimated at from three to five millions of dollars. The larger part of it has been given originally in small sums by the rural population of the Northern States, [225] and it has been given, in our judgment, almost entirely if not purely, from considerations of humanity and charity.

X.

The Public slow to meet the Occasion.

The contributions at first were comparatively small, especially those from the country, and it was only just before the harvesting of a new crop at the South, and the consequent abandonment of our canvass for contributions, that anything like general interest and liberality seemed to have been awakened. Had the famine continued a month longer, or had it been possible to thoroughly canvass the country within the period to which our duty was limited, we are confident that the amount which passed through our hands might have been more than doubled.

There are many reasons to account for this tardiness in meeting the occasion besides those which would ordinarily apply to a charitable movement; and to some of these it is but just that reference should be made.

XI.

Effect of the War on Charitable Undertakings.

It must be remembered in the first place, that the people who are generally found readiest to respond to calls of charity, had, in most cases, made contributions for the relief of the sick and wounded during the war, with a liberality which had seriously reduced their means of benevolence, and that since the war they had generally been freely assisting those disabled by it, or the wives and children of the fallen. Under these circumstances, no appeal to their kindness could be effective, the ground for which were not obviously of a very substantial nature.

XII.

Public Incredulity and the Reasons for it.

Unfortunately there were apparent reasons for incredulity in regard to the truth of the statements upon which our appeal rested, which could not be effectively controverted at a word.

For instance: Although the system of labor which had long been considered essential to the successful cultivation of the cotton crop, had been just abandoned, and an extensive destruction of the stock, tools and machinery of the cotton plantations had occurred, a crop of cotton had been secured which, though not as large as some that had been raised in favorable seasons under the old system, was still a considerable one.

In fact, it had been sufficient to so reduce the market value of that staple, as to cause the abandonment of its cultivation in many other countries [226] where it had been successfully pursued as long as the rebellion continued in arms.

It was known that the cotton crop was peculiarly dependant on frequent supplies of moisture, and that it was to the advantage offered in this respect by the climate of the South, that it was due that a given degree of intelligence and labor, there applied to cotton culture, usually secured a larger and surer reward than anywhere else in the world.

In view of these facts, the announcement that the principal food crop of the South, which in northern experience is less unfavorably affected by the dry periods of summer than any, had been almost entirely cut off, failed to meet with ready credence.

The public was the more disposed to be sceptical because of many previous reports of short crops, which had been made by speculators, and of false rumors of famine at the South during the four years of the war.

It was not difficult to imagine other motives than those of pure humanity for activity in urging contributions for the benefit of the South. Our labors were unfortunately associated in the mind of the public, with those of organizations which had some years before been formed for the purpose of reconciling public opinion to the schemes of those who are now known to have been even then preparing the rebellion which has brought so many happy households to poverty and mourning. Expressions in southern newspapers seemed to confirm a suspicion that what the South wanted was, not so much relief from famine, as reparation for the destruction of property which had been incident to the means used to establish the sovereignty of the national Government.

On the other hand, many suspected that whatever real lack of food there might be was felt mainly by the negroes, and was due to their refusal to work; and these, generally held that to give them gratuitous relief would only serve to confirm them in their idle and agrarian tendencies.

XIII.

The Causes of the Distress Considered.

Having carefully reviewed the ground, it is proper for us in conclusion to answer those who have given us their confidence, that we have no reason to suppose that the degree of peril to life occasioned by the famine has been heretofore reported with any exaggeration, nor to doubt that this peril was mainly and directly owing to the unusual drought of 1866.

The reasons for hesitating to accept these conclusions to which we [227] have referred, are in a great measure removed when it is considered that an extraordinary price for cotton had everywhere stimulated extraordinary efforts to increase the supply, that the negro laborers had, to a degree much greater than ever before, a direct interest in the crop, and consequently they, as well as the planters, were disposed to exert themselves in combatting the difficulties of the season so far as cotton was concerned.

It must also be remembered, that the intelligence and capital of the South had been so much concentrated on the cotton crop, and that food crops had been so habitually left to rude and careless management, that a large part of the corn required for the sustenance of the population had generally been procured from the North.

Owing to their having been deprived of the usual means of civilized education, and the ordinary conditions under which provident habits and fertility of resource are developed, the white people not directly interested in the cotton plantations, are singularly unable to resort to expedients for meeting a disappointment in their ordinary means of providing for themselves such as would be elsewhere readily adopted. Unaccustomed to labor for wages, and having generally nothing to dispose of in exchange for food, they have in fact more than once before been placed in peril of life by a drought less protracted than that of last year.

It appears to us in fact that a considerable part of the population which has at this time required our assistance, has long been living under such conditions, that any general cause of disaster was sure to at once reduce many thousand to the last degree of misery, should they be left unprovided for by the charity of those more fortunate or more provident than themselves.

XIV.

The Duty Remaining.

By God’s blessing the particular calamity for the relief of which our Commission was instituted is overpast, but we cannot close our report without expressing the hope that no one who reads it will feel discharged of a special duty toward those who have been the chief sufferers.

The reign of peace, and the progress of prosperity of our land, will again and always be commensurate with the degree in which the well-being of each of its inhabitants is knitted in with that of all others, and with the degree in which each of us has the intelligence to perceive, the faith to pursue, and the skill to advance this co-ordination of interests.

On the other hand, the feebleness of law, the insecurity of life and property, and the instability of all that is hopeful or respectable in our present condition, will be proportionate to the looseness of the fabric of common [228] obligations and common advantages, which constitutes the essential bond of the Republic.

Indifference to poverty and ignorance on the one side, and the pursuit of wealth without the purpose and habit of rendering equivalent service for all that is gained on the other, are the great dissevering agencies which threaten, in the future as in the past, to spoil all that we may labor for, and destroy all that we hold dear. It remains to be seen whether the war, which has cost us so much, has, after all, brought us nearer in our public or our private life to the divine requirement, “Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you.”

How, having this year given a little of our abundant corn to save the lives of a few thousand of our poor neighbors and countrymen, we can now help them make their lives of some little value to themselves, their country and the world may be a problem which is not to be solved without much study. But it is a problem which we cannot long afford to leave unsolved. The stain of our children’s blood will rest upon our souls as well as upon the poor riches we may leave behind us if another generation grows up in the same ignorance and the same hopelessness as the last. Our dear bought victory has not saved our country; it has only gained us the opportunity of saving it. Let us not then turn our backs or fold our hands.

William A. Booth,	John Taylor Johnston,
Nathan Bishop,	David Hoadley,
L. W. Jerome,	William M. Vermilye,
Howard Potter,	John M. Bruce, Jr.,
William T. Coleman,	Samuel D. Babcock,
Geo. Cabot Ward,	J. Pierpont Morgan,
William E. Dodge, Jr.,	Theodore Rosevelt,
David Crawford, Jr.,	Robert H. McCurdy,
Robert L. Kennedy,	B. F. Butler,
W. H. Osborn,	Seth B. Hunt,
Solon Humphreys,	Robert B. Minturn,
Robert Potter,	Fred. G. Foster,
Elliot C. Cowdin,	Daniel Butterfield,
C. R. Agnew,	John Bowne.

Archibald Russell, President.

James M. Brown, Treasurer.

Edward Bright, Corresponding Secretary.

Fred. Law Olmsted, Recording Secretary.