Widely calamitous accidents, like this of the Arctic, always have their good consequences in stimulating research, discovery and invention, and thus [323] in constantly diminishing the liability of their recurrence. In the multitude of counselors there is wisdom, and all should be encouraged to make public any means to prevent collisions at sea that may occur to them. That the general excitement may be usefully directed, however, it is well to show the impracticability which is sure to characterize the great majority of these suggestions.

Whenever a disaster occurs to any of our great modern machines of locomotion, it is the first impulse of most persons to blindly blame their speed, as the cause of it. This is generally found upon investigation to be an error. The loitering sloops and slow coaches of our fathers murdered a larger proportion of their passengers than our clipper ships, steamers and railroads. r have been an extensive traveler, and it is my experience that the fastest conveyances, whether steamers, railway trains, or mail coaches, are the safest and surest. This is not because mere speed is in itself an element of safety in all cases (it is so sometimes), but because the same enterprise and skill which obtains speed is most likely to secure safety along with it. As to railroads, r believe that the absence of a healthy and sufficient competition is the prime cause of accidents. I believe that it is perfectly practicable to run our trains regularly at sixty miles an hour, and with greater safety than they are now run at fifteen or twenty. And on steamboats, every Western traveler will bear witness that it is the cheap third rate craft, whose owners are liars, and whose officers ruffians, that most frequently burst, burn, snag and sink. In all our public conveyances, whether on land or sea, the great danger arises from a false economy in wages.

As to what has been libelously termed the “murderous speed” of the Arctic, you have already shown how it may be that the safety of those on board a steamer is in proportion to the impetus, and consequently the speed, with which she comes in collision with the class of vessels she is most likely to meet on the Banks.

Another advantage arising from speed in a fog has been thus far overlooked by the public, so much indeed that one conservative soul insists that the steamers should always stop entirely when they encounter a fog. To whom it might not probably be a sufficient answer that if they did so, it is probable that instead of the chances (not more than one in ten thousand) of a collision, and the then further chances to the passengers of drowning, there would be the almost inevitable certainty of their starving to death. For on the “Banks” and in the Gulf-stream there is always fog. At the same time, I am told, it is calculated that on an average, in the usual sailing track between here and Europe, there are seventy square miles of free water for every vessel at any given time. I have myself been sixty days afloat at one time when no other vessel came within sight of the one I was in. Suppose the passage across the foggy region is made by a steamer by running thirteen miles an hour in twenty-four hours; is not the danger of a collision to all parties less than if she remains forty-eight hours in the fog by running at half speed? If the Arctic had been running 13 1/10 miles an hour instead of 13 (if that was her exact speed while in the fog), she would have escaped the collision with the Vesta just as certainly as if she had been [324] going at less speed than she was, while in the latter case the danger of her collision with other vessels would have been increased. I have myself seen a collision between two large vessels escaped by a hair’s-breadth, which would inevitably have occurred and probably sent aloft some hundred souls, if the speed of either had been in the slightest less than it was.

A large vessel will be generally less damaged by coming in contact with a small one, if the former is sailing rapidly, than if she is sailing slowly, and as the course of small craft can usually be more easily changed, and they can be handled more rapidly, it is their business to keep out of the way of large craft. This is less the case, however, when the larger craft is a steamer. High speed on a steamer, while it increases her own safety, adds to the danger of small craft before her, because within the time she is running the distance at which objects are perceptible in the usual fog on the Banks, it is not possible to materially vary the position of the small craft, or to alter the course or check the speed of the steamer. And now a word about fog signals.

I have hardly taken up a newspaper since the loss of the Arctic was announced, that I have not seen the firing of cannon recommended, or taken for granted to be the best means of warning to vessels to get out of the way of the steamer in a fog; yet it would seem that a moment’s consideration of the narrative of events, would have shown the absurdity of the suggestion. Immediately after the danger occasioned by the collision was discovered to be imminent, the Arctic began and thereafter continued till the moment at which she was submerged, to fire cannon. And we can but envy the fate of that one

[325] Hero—and tearfully congratulate rather than commiserate his father—who, amid the general devilish cowardice of the wretched crew, went down doing his duty, a true man—the utmost end of a man fulfilling. Perhaps yet, it may be found that this was not lost—perhaps some vessel was attracted toward the sinking steamer by this firing, and arriving near where she disappeared after all the boats had left, perhaps she has picked up some of those persons, still floating, whose loss we now deplore. For this is always understood to be the object of cannon-firing at sea, when no other is apparent, to attract vessels, not to warn them off. Cannon firing is a signal of distress.

Yet, in connection with this recommendation of cannon firing, a really practical suggestion, though not quite original, has been made. It is to give notice of the course of the firing vessel by varying the number and rapidity of the discharges. This may be applied to other means of warning by noise, as for instance to the steam whistle. I see no sufficient objection to a general law requiring all steam vessels to be provided with the most powerful steam whistles or trumpets, and that these shall be used at certain, fixed, frequent intervals in fogs, in such manner as shall signal within hearing of them the course pursued by the steamer. Thus one blast, ten seconds in length, might mean North; two of ten seconds, East; three, South; one of ten seconds, followed by one of five seconds, N. E.; one of ten seconds, one of one second, and one of five, N. N. E.; two of ten seconds, one of one second, two of five seconds, E.S.E.; and so on. A short, a moderate, and a long blast would constitute the letters, and sixteen words could be very plainly and quickly spelled with them. Perhaps eight would be all that would be desirable, and the system might be still further simplified with advantage. Experiments may be usefully made to obtain a more powerful or penetrating noise than that of the ordinary whistle now in use. There must be an absolute requirement that such signals shall be frequently repeated in fogs by the steamers, else the annoyance they will occasion to passengers will prevent their being used. It is probable that such blasts of the steam-whistle could be heard and clearly distinguished on board any sailing vessel within an eighth—perhaps a quarter—of a mile of a steamer. It would only be otherwise when the sailer was to windward of the steamer in a gale, and unless the former were scudding, the danger of a collision would be small, because of the slow progress of the steamer to windward.

It is extremely improbable that any fog signals can be used that will serve to warn off steamships. The rumble and dash of the engines and paddles drowns all exterior noises. Let anyone consider what a terrifically loud crash there must have been when the bows of the Vesta were stove against the broad side of the Arctic—thick plates of iron and heavy timbers breaking up like glass—and consider that this crash was imperceptible to many in the Arctic, and by others was thought to be merely the dash of a little heavier than ordinary wave, and the impracticability of giving warning to a steamer at any distance will be better appreciated. Therefore it is that sailing vessels, in a fog, must look out for themselves against a steamer, and a steamer must provide for her [326] own safety by running with sufficient speed to crowd off or run down anything afloat in their way.

And therefore, again, it is proper that the law positively require that the best possible fog signals should be constantly used by a steamer when running in a fog, and make the officers of the deck responsible with their lives, for any loss of life that may occur from their neglect to employ them. The occasional tolling of a bell—the only Signal now in ordinary use—is by no means sufficient. I do not remember any instance of two steamers ever having come in collision at sea before this of the Arctic and Vesta, and it is fortunate that the danger is so small, for I know not in what direction to look for any practicable means of lessening the liability of its occurrence, except by increased, incessant and responsible vigilance on the part of the officers and men.

The danger of running ashore—much greater than that of collision with other ships, in the vicinity where the Arctic and the City of Philadelphia were lost, I am not considering. To avoid collisions, the great requisite is vigilance—in a fog, a good look out, forward and aft, alow and aloft. To save shipwreck the great requisite is science. The master who, when running at full speed, has put his craft ashore, stem-on, after a passage only from Cape Clear to Cape Race, must be thought not properly educated for the duties that have been culpably devolved by the owners upon him, or else he has not been adequately supplied with instruments.

The loss of property alone, in the foundering of the Arctic, would have been a matter of public regret. The first plain lesson (even if there had been no more deplorable loss) would have been that hereafter all ships destined to carry valuable cargoes or which were themselves of great value, should be provided, as was the Vesta, with permanent, watertight bulk-heads, dividing the hold into several close apartments. Here the smaller vessel with damage which, but for this provision, would have been far more quickly fatal, proceeds at once upon her way towards a safe port, where she arrives safely and speedily, while the poor Arctic, after two or three hours’ steam and hand-pumping. is claimed by the irresistible sea. It is probably within the selfish interest of the underwriters to make this element of safety rapidly become a general one. But if they do not soon take measures for this purpose, the law should again be employed—all vessels unprovided with bulk-heads should be taxed sufficiently to make it the interest of their owners to provide them, and all vessels in the regular passenger traffic should be required to be furnished with them, as they now are with lifeboats.

But it is wrong any longer to talk of the dreadful loss of life which is now sending a shudder of bereavement through half the civilized world. as the result of the accident which sunk the Arctic. By the proper use of the means at hand the passengers and crew might all have been saved after the accident occurred.

It is doubted, I know by some, if the Arctic was provided with all the derniers resorts, which are required by law. I judge that she was so,, but [327] whether or not, should be ascertained by a searching and pitiless legal inquisition, and though I have the most heartfelt condolence for Mr. Collins, and sympathize fully in the national gratitude to his enterprise and energy, I hope if the owners are found guilty of neglect in this particular, the utmost penalty of the law will be enforced. Provisions to secure life in the event of the loss of ships are much less neglected now than they have formerly been, but yet they are so much more than is reasonable or just to passengers. I have never seen but one vessel in which printed instructions were placed before passengers, how to behave, where to place themselves, and what to do in a dangerous emergency. It should be known on the steamers that when it is best to take to the boats, the officers will certainly inform the passengers, that in that case, such a boat will be manned by the first officer and such a number of’ his watch, and will take on board, for instance, the passengers having their berths in the starboard main cabin; that such another boat will be commanded by the boatswain, and will take on board the second-cabin passengers; such another by the second officer, and that it will be reserved for the engineers and firemen; and so of the rest. And it should be well understood that the officers will shoot down the first man, passenger or otherwise, who attempts to occupy another boat to that for which he is detailed, and that in the event of a fatal accident to any of the boats the proper crew of that boat will be immediately divided into so many squads as there are boats remaining, by their boat’s officer and such squad be directed to which other boat they shall attach themselves; if then it is necessary to leave any behind more than volunteer, that it shall be decided by lot who they are to be.

It was not the result of the accident I have said—that which we are now mourning. It arose as far as the accounts received at the period at which I write, would indicate, from the want of common morality, common manliness on the part of the crew and from the absence of proper discipline. Is Capt. Luce to blame for this lack of discipline? It is no time yet to allow a direct answer to this question to be in one’s mind.

The commanders of these great packet steamers have two such divided and distinct classes of duties expected of them that it is hardly possible they can satisfactorily perform both. As far as my own observation goes, the British steamer commanders, who do not succeed as well as the Americans in gaining the admiration and friendship of their passengers, and who, I believe, are themselves no better seamen or navigators, do maintain a better, more exact and orderly discipline in their ships. The seamen and servants work with less spirit and rapidity, perhaps, but they work more by rule and routine and they are consequently more to be depended upon. Discipline does not mean forced or frightened obedience as too many young officers suppose; discipline means system. And I say that on the English steamers the seamen work more as a part of a system, of which their officers are another part, and in the American, more as individuals led or driven together by their officers, though this is less so on the Collins line than any other.

I maintain that our whole merchant marine, in this respect, is deeply, [328] radically, disgracefully, demoralized. The very small number of Native American seamen, so far from being the brave, generous, heroic men they are poetically and romantically described to be, are the very meanest, most reckless, dastardly and despicable class of men ever allowed to be long at liberty in the world. Why? Because the seamen in American ships (I do not mean in American alone) are so treated that it is impossible for them to retain self-respect and decent, orderly, gentlemanly habits of mind; and, therefore, no American whose disposition and character is good, will go to sea unless he is unusually fortunate in his ships, and has the hope held before him of rapid preferment. I do not believe there is one native seaman in a hundred, who is not a helpless drunkard when on shore, and always shipped in an intoxicated condition when he goes to sea. And there are even a smaller number who do not always fear and hate their officers when at sea, obey them from fear more than from a regard to their contract or from the effect of a decent discipline, and desert them whenever they dare to, if their selfish interests or instincts direct it. And all this is even more true of the foreigners who have been long in our service (with frequent exceptions in the seamen of Northern Continental Europe), with the additional disadvantage that they are more ignorant, less cultivated intellectually, and consequently more desperate in villainy, more cowardly, and more unreasonable and uncontrollable in times of danger.

While our Commerce has increased with amazing rapidity, our number of native seamen has probably hardly increased at all in the last ten years. Consequently wages have nearly doubled for first rate, able seamen, and many a ship goes to sea half manned, and with a crew composed of desperadoes and sots, too mean to live ashore, and only made to do ships’ duty by a constant irritating and brutalizing system of working up and bullying on the part of the officers.

What wonder their character becomes slavish and even diabolical!

This difficulty is increasing yearly. It is already a great drawback upon the successful progress of our commercial supremacy. Is there no help for it—no remedy? In the present excitement let reflection be directed to this also. I am only satisfied that the remedy will not tend to make seamen less men and more slaves, less rationally orderly, and more machine-like. Meantime the discipline of these great steam packets should be educational as well as sufficient for the trip. The crews, as much as possible, should be in the permanent service of the lines. They should be brought under as perfect habits of disciplined control as are ever the crews of our men-of-war. Contrast the conduct of the crew of the Somers, when she was lost off Vera Cruz, with that of the Arctic. The brig capsized and sunk, and the crew were left swimming with some drifting wreck of spars, sufficient only partially to support them; but they were loyal to their duty and their contract, and had confidence in their officers. Disciplined order was immediately restored, and directions were given for the assistance of the weaker and poorer swimmers, and for other purposes; which were obeyed implicitly, and without a moment’s hesitation, by men struggling [329] for life under far more desperate circumstances than those of the Arctic at the time the boats left her and the raft was crowded upon and broken up.